Abstract-Attacking fingerprint-based biometric systems by presenting fake fingers at the sensor could be a serious threat for unattended applications. This work introduces a new approach for discriminating fake fingers from real ones, based on the analysis of skin distortion. The user is required to move the finger while pressing it against the scanner surface, thus deliberately exaggerating the skin distortion. Novel techniques for extracting, encoding and comparing skin distortion information are formally defined and systematically evaluated over a test set of real and fake fingers. The proposed approach is privacy friendly and does not require additional expensive hardware besides a fingerprint scanner capable of capturing and delivering frames at proper rate. The experimental results indicate the new approach to be a very promising technique for making fingerprint recognition systems more robust against fake-finger-based spoofing attempts.
I. INTRODUCTION

B
IOMETRIC systems offer great benefits with respect to other authentication techniques: in particular, they are often more user friendly and can guarantee the physical presence of the user. Thanks to their good performance and to the growing market of low-cost acquisition devices, fingerprintbased identification/verification systems are becoming very popular and are being deployed in a wide range of applications: from PC logon to electronic commerce, from ATMs to physical access control [18] . On the other hand, it is important to understand that, as any other authentication technique, fingerprint recognition is not totally spoof-proof. The main potential threats for fingerprint-based systems are [28] , [29] • attacking the communication channels, including replay attacks on the channel between the sensor and the rest of the system; • attacking specific software modules (e.g., replacing the feature extractor or the matcher with a Trojan horse); • attacking the database of enrolled templates; • presenting fake fingers to the sensor. Recently, the feasibility of the last type of attack has been reported by some researchers [19] , [25] : they showed that it is actually possible to spoof some fingerprint recognition systems with well-made fake fingertips ( Fig. 1) , created with the collaboration of the fingerprint owner or from a latent Manuscript received January 18, 2006 ; revised May 3, 2006 . This work was supported by the European Commission (BioSec-FP6 IST-2002-001766). The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Dr. Anil Jain.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2006.879289 fingerprint; in the latter case, the procedure is more difficult but still possible. A deep study on the feasibility of spoofing some commercial fingerprint scanners was performed by the authors within the BioSec project [1] , [5] , [2] . From the critical review of the related bibliography (as described in Section II) and from the 24-months experience we accumulated by making hundreds of fake fingers with different materials and procedures and using them to spoof existing fingerprint scanners (of different types: optical, capacitive, thermals, RF-based, etc.), we may draw some conclusions.
• Forging a fake finger is not as easy as some authors claim, even when the person whose finger has to be cloned is cooperative; it is necessary to find the right materials to mould the cast, learn the right process and handle with care the artificial finger.
• Creating a fake finger from a latent fingerprint is significantly more difficult, requiring a skill comparable to that of a forensic expert equipped with the appropriate instrumentation.
• To the best of our knowledge and from the experience gained testing recent scanners provided with fake detection mechanisms, nowadays, in spite of the claims of some fingerprint scanner producers, no commercial fingerprint scanner (among those we tested) seems to be resistant to well-made fake fingerprints. • The lack of satisfactory solutions to reject fake fingers shows that there are a lot of challenges in fake detection; more research and investments on fingerprint fake detection methods are needed. This work introduces a novel method for discriminating fake fingers from real ones, based on the analysis of a peculiar characteristic of the human skin: its elasticity. When a real finger moves on a scanner surface, it produces a significant amount of distortion, which can be observed to be quite different from that produced by fake fingers. Usually fake fingers are more rigid than skin and the distortion is definitely lower; even if highly elastic materials are used, it seems very difficult to precisely emulate the specific way a real finger is distorted, because the behavior is related to the way the external skin is anchored to the underlying derma and influenced by the position and shape of the finger bone.
The analysis of skin distortion requires in input a sequence of frames instead of a single static image. To this purpose, the fingerprint scanner must be able to deliver a set of frames (Fig. 2) to the processing unit at a high speed (at least 20 frames per second). In our study, we used the prototype of a fingerprint scanner that the company Biometrika developed within the BioSec project [5] (Fig. 3) .
A database of video sequences has been collected, acquiring images both from real and fake fingers. Systematic experiments have been performed to understand how much the proposed method is capable to discriminate real from fake fingers; the results achieved are very promising.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the state-of-the art in this field, Section III describes the proposed approach, Section IV reports the experimentation carried out to validate the new technique, and finally Section V draws some conclusions.
II. RELATED WORKS
Several papers have been recently devoted to this important topic: from the analysis of potential weaknesses in generic biometric systems [28] , [29] , [34] , to experiments aimed at investigating how current fingerprint verification systems can be spoofed [6] , [16] , [19] , [25] , [33] ; from proposals of possible solutions [1] , [2] , [9] , [10] , [20] , [24] , to surveys of the current state-of-the-art [31] .
It is worth noting that the idea of spoofing fingerprint recognition systems by using a fake reproduction of the fingertip is not a novelty. The idea seems to have been described for the first time by the mystery writer R. A. Freeman in the book "The Red Thumb Mark" [12] , published in 1907. More recently, James Bond in the film Diamonds are Forever (1971) was able to spoof a fingerprint check with a thin layer of latex glued on his fingertip [35] . However, only recently some researchers published the results of experiments aimed at analyzing such vulnerability.
• In [25] , the authors described two methods for creating fake fingers: duplication with cooperation and without cooperation; in both these cases, the material used to create the fakes was silicone; six different commercial fingerprint scanners were tested and the authors reported to be able to spoof all of them at the first or second attempt.
• In [19] , it was reported that fakes created with gelatin were more effective, in particular against scanners based on solid-state sensors [18] ; similar to [25] , the authors described cooperative and noncooperative fake-creation methods; 11 commercial fingerprint scanners were tested, with a success rate higher than 67% for both the cooperative and the noncooperative scenarios.
• In [6] , three commercial fingerprint scanners were tested:
all of them were spoofed by fake fingers made of gelatin, with a level of ease depending on the scanner and software characteristics.
• In [16] , the studies reported in [25] and [19] were extended by testing new scanners that included specific fake detection measures; the authors concluded that such measures were able to reject fake fingers made of nonconductive materials (such as silicone), but were not able to detect conductive materials such as gelatin. The main fake finger detection techniques that have been proposed to date can be roughly classified as explained in the rest of this section.
• Analysis of skin details in the acquired images: using very high resolution sensors (e.g., 1000 dpi) allows to capture some details that may be useful for fake detection, such as sweat pores [18] or coarseness of the skin texture [20] . In fact, it has been experimentally noted that typical materials used to make fake fingers (e.g., gelatin) usually consist of large organic molecules that tend to amalgamate, resulting in a surface coarser than human skin and where small details such as pores are not present or poorly reproduced.
• Analysis of static properties of the finger: additional hardware is used to capture information such as temperature [25] , impedance or other electric measurements [15] , [32] , odor [2] , and spectroscopy [21] . In [2] , electronic noses are used with the aim of detecting the odor of those materials that are typically used to create fake fingers (e.g., silicone or gelatin); spectroscopy-based techniques expose the skin to multiple wavelengths of light and analyze the reflected spectrum: nonhuman tissues show a spectrum usually quite different from human ones. Other techniques [7] direct light to the finger from two or more sources and capture fingerprint images with different illuminations: the authors claim that it is possible to discriminate between real and fake fingers by comparing such differently illuminated images.
• Analysis of dynamic properties of the finger, such as: skin perspiration [10] , [24] , pulse oximetry [23] , blood pulsation [17] , [23] and skin elasticity [1] , [11] , [9] . To date, fake detection by skin-perspiration is probably the technique most deeply studied in scientific publications: the idea is to exploit the perspiration of the skin that, starting from the pores, diffuses in the fingerprint patter following the ridge lines, making them appear darker over time. In [24] , the perspiration process is detected through a time-series of images acquired from the scanner over a time window of a few seconds. Skin elasticity, which produces distortion in the acquired fingerprint images [18] , has been studied in some previous works, but mainly focusing on the problems that such distortion causes to fingerprint matching algorithms [3] , [22] , [27] , [30] , or trying to find a mathematical model to explain its behavior [8] . In [11] , it was suggested that the acquisition of a video sequence of fingerprint images could be used to define a new type of biometric feature, which combines a physiological trait (fingerprint) to behavioral traits (e.g., a particular movement of the finger on the sensor chosen by the user); the authors underlined that this new biometric feature, among the other advantages, could be harder to be spoofed, but they did not reported any experiment with fake fingers. In [1] , we briefly introduced a fake detection approach based on skin distortion and reported some preliminary results. In this paper, the whole technique is described and experiments with a new prototype scanner are reported and discussed.
III. FAKE FINGER DETECTION APPROACH
The user is required to place a finger onto the scanner surface and to apply some pressure while rotating the finger in either clockwise or counter-clockwise direction (this particular movement has been chosen after some initial tests, as it seems quite easy for the user and it produces the right amount of distortion). A sequence of frames is acquired at a high frame rate during the movement and analyzed to extract relevant features related to skin distortion. Although the finger can be rotated at different speed, we experimentally found that an angular speed of about 15 per second is optimal for measuring the distortion.
Some constraints are enforced to simplify the subsequent processing steps; in particular
• any frame such that the amount of rotation with respect to the previous one (inter-frame rotation) is less than is discarded (the inter-frame rotation angle is calculated as described in Section III-B); is a parameter whose optimal value has been experimentally determined as 0.25 (see Section IV-B); • only frames acquired when the rotation of the finger is less than are considered: when angle has been reached, the acquisition halts (the rotation angle of the finger is calculated as described in Section III-E-1). is a parameter that was set to 15 in the experimentations (see Section IV-B); hence, if we assume an angular speed of about 15 per second, on the average, the user is required to rotate the finger for about 1 s before the system informs her or him that the acquisition process is terminated. Let be a sequence of images that satisfies the above constraints: each frame , , is segmented by isolating the fingerprint area from the background; then, for each frame , the following steps are performed ( Fig. 4 ):
• computation of the optical flow between the current frame and the next one; • computation of the distortion map; • temporal integration of the distortion map; • computation of the DistortionCode from the integrated distortion map. At the beginning of the sequence, the finger is assumed relaxed (i.e., nondistorted), without any superficial tension; this is reasonable since when the finger approaches the sensor platen there is no skin distortion.
The isolation of the fingerprint area from the background is performed by computing the gradient of the image block-wise: let be a generic pixel in the image and a square block of frame centered in : each whose gradient module exceeds a given threshold is associated to the foreground [18] (Fig. 5 ). Only foreground blocks are considered in the rest of the algorithm.
A. Computation of the Optical Flow
Block-wise correlation is computed to detect the new position of each block in frame . For each block , the vector denotes the estimated movement of from frame to frame . In the following, for simplifying the notation, will be indicated as . A graphical representation of the movement vectors (see Fig. 6 ), is also known in the literature as optical flow [4] .
This method is in theory only translation-invariant but, since the images are taken at a fast frame rate, for small blocks it is possible to assume a certain rotation-and deformation-invariance.
The block size (in pixels) is a parameter that should be adjusted according to the sensor area and resolution. If the blocks are too small, they do not contain enough information to univocally identify their positions in the subsequent frame. Otherwise, if they are too large, two problems may arise: the algorithm would become computationally expensive and the distortion could make the matching unfeasible. To increase the accuracy of the optical flow, the blocks can be also partially overlapped: in this case the distance among the centers of two consecutive blocks is smaller than the block size.
In order to filter out outliers produced by noise, by false correlation matches, or by other anomalies, the optical flow is then regularized as follows.
1) Each such that is discarded . This step allows to remove outliers, under the assumption that the movement of each block cannot deviate too much from the largest movement of the blocks of the previous frame; is a parameter that should correspond to the maximum expected acceleration between two consecutive frames. 2) For each , the value is calculated as the weighted average of the 3 3 neighbours of , using a 3 3 Gaussian mask; elements discarded by the previous step are not included in the average: if no valid elements are present, is marked as "invalid".
3) Each such that is discarded. This step allows to remove elements that are not consistent with their neighbours; is a parameter that controls the strength of this procedure. 4) are recalculated as in step 2, but considering only the elements retained at step 3. Fig. 7 shows the optical flow before ( vectors) and after ( vectors) the steps described above.
B. Computation of the Distortion Map
The center of rotation is estimated as the weighted average of the positions of all the foreground blocks such that the corresponding movement vector is valid is valid (1) where is the average of the elements in set . The inter-frame rotation angle (around the center ) and the translation vector are then computed in the least square sense, starting from all of the average movement vectors (2) using the Gauss-Newton approach to numerically solve the problem [13] .
If the finger were moving solidly, then each movement vector would be coherent with and . Even if the movement is not solid, and still encode the dominant movement and, for each block , the distortion can be computed as the incoherence of each average movement vector with respect to and . In particular, if a movement vector were computed according to a solid movement, then its value would be (3) and, therefore, the distortion can be defined as the residual if is valid otherwise.
(4)
A distortion map is defined as a block-wise image whose blocks encode the distortion values [ Fig. 8(a) ].
C. Temporal Integration of the Distortion Map
The computation of the distortion map, made on just two consecutive frames, is affected by three problems.
• The movement vectors are discrete (because of the discrete nature of the images) and, in case of small movement, the loss of accuracy might be significant. • Errors in seeking the new position of blocks could lead to a wrong distortion estimation. • The measured distortion is proportional to the amount of movement between two frames (and, therefore, depends on the finger speed), without considering previous tension accumulated/released. This makes it difficult to compare a distortion map against the distortion map of another sequence.
An effective solution to the above problems is to perform a temporal-integration of the distortion map, resulting in an integrated distortion map [ Fig. 8(b) ]. The temporal integration is simply obtained by block-wise summing the current distortion map to the distortion map "accumulated" in the previous frames. Each integrated distortion element is defined as shown in (5) at the bottom of the page with . The rationale behind the definition is that if the norm of the average movement vector is smaller than the norm of the estimated solid movement , then the block is moving slower than expected and this means it is accumulating tension (i.e., distortion). Otherwise, if the norm of is larger than the norm of , the block is moving faster than expected, thus it is slipping on the sensor surface releasing the tension accumulated.
The integrated distortion map solves most of the previously listed problems: 1) discretization and local estimation errors are no longer serious problems because the integration tends to produce smoothed values; 2) for a given movement trajectory, the integrated distortion map is quite invariant with respect to the finger speed. Fig. 9 shows the integrated distortion maps computed for a given image sequence acquired by rotating a real finger.
D. Distortioncode
Comparing two sequences of integrated distortion maps, both acquired under the same movement trajectory, is the basis of this fake finger detection approach. On the other hand, directly comparing two sequences of integrated distortion maps would be computationally very demanding and it would be quite difficult to deal with the unavoidable local changes between the sequences.
To simplify this task, a feature vector (called DistortionCode for the analogy with the FingerCode introduced in [14] ) is extracted from each integrated distortion map: circular annuli of increasing radius ( , , where is the radius of the smaller annulus) are centered in and superimposed to the map. For each annulus , a feature is computed as the average of the integrated distortion elements of the blocks falling inside it (Fig. 10) belongs to annulus (6) The number of annuli and the radius are parameters that must be chosen to optimally cover a typical fingerprint, according to the sensor area and resolution. The DistortionCodes are invariant to rotation since distortion values are averaged over the circular annuli; they are also invariant with respect to the position of the fingerprint in the image (translation), since they are centered in ; in any case, it should be noted that translation accuracy is not critical because of the integrated and global nature of the features adopted.
A DistortionCode sequence is then defined by normalizing the distortion codes where
The obtained DistortionCode sequence (Fig. 11) characterizes the distortion of a particular finger under a specific movement. Further sequences from the same finger do not necessarily lead to the same DistortionCode sequence: the overall length might be different, because the user could produce the same trajectory (or a similar trajectory) faster or slower. While a minor rotation accumulates less tension, during a major rotation the finger could slip and the tension be released in the middle of the sequence. Therefore, a straightforward comparison of DistortionCode sequences is not feasible and an alignment technique like those introduced in Sections III-E1 and III-E2 is necessary.
E. Distortion Match Function
In order to discriminate a real finger from a fake one, the DistortionCode sequence acquired at verification/identification time (current sequence) is compared with a reference sequence obtained from a real finger. The reference sequence may be a sequence acquired from the finger of the same user during an "enrolment" session (similarly to what happens in biometric recognition), or a predefined "ideal" sequence to be adopted for all users (in this case the fake-detection system does not require an enrolment stage, see Section IV-C). Let be the reference sequence and the current sequence; a distortion match function DMF compares the reference and the current sequence and returns a score in the range , indicating how much the current sequence is similar to the reference sequence (1 means maximum similarity).
A Distortion Match Function must define how to do the following.
Step 1) Calculate the similarity between two DistortionCodes.
Step 2) Align the elements by establishing a correspondence between the DistortionCodes of the two sequences and .
Step 3) Measure the similarity between the two aligned sequences. As to Step 1), a simple Euclidean distance between two DistortionCodes has been adopted, since it is a good metric and also very efficient to be computed, having the vectors a very small dimensionality. As to Step 2), two different approaches have been experimented.
• Aligning the sequences according to the accumulated interframe rotation (Section III-E1).
• Aligning the sequences using dynamic time warping (DTW) [26] (Section III-E2). In both cases, the result of Step 2) is a new DistortionCode sequence , obtained from during the alignment process with ; has the same cardinality of and the final similarity can be simply computed (Step 3) as the average Euclidean distance of corresponding DistortionCodes in and . Fig. 11 . Sequence of DistortionCodes calculated on the integrated distortion maps in Fig. 9 . Fig. 12 . Example of DTW alignment. On the left, the mapping function DTW(i), which maps each DistortionCode in the current sequence to a DistortionCode in the reference sequence. On the right, a graphical representation of the same mapping: note that the same DistorsionCode in the reference sequence can be associated twice or more times (or not associated at all), not only to deal with different lengths but, more in general, to find the optimal alignment.
1) Aligning the Sequences According to the Accumulated Inter-Frame Rotation:
Any DistortionCode can be associated to the rotation angle obtained by accumulating the inter-frame rotation angles (see Section III-B): . This approach determines optimal pairing between the DistortionCodes in and according to rotation angles ; interpolation is used to deal with discretization effects. The new sequence is obtained by calculating, for each pair in the current sequence, a new distortion code from the two consecutive DistortionCodes in the reference sequence and (where ) as follows: (8) Equation (8) simply estimates as the linear interpolation of the distortion codes corresponding to the two closest rotation angles.
2) Aligning the Sequences Using Dynamic Time Warping:
The main limitation of the previous alignment approach is that the distortion is not only related to the amount of rotation, but also to the pressure applied while rotating the finger, and more in general to the movement performed, hence aligning only on the basis of the rotation angle may be not always a good choice.
An alternative approach to align the two DistortionCode sequences is based on DTW [26] . Using DTW with constrained endpoints, slope three and the Euclidean distance as a cost function, each DistortionCode in is associated to a DistortionCode (see Fig. 12 ). This allows to warp the time dimension of the reference sequence to obtain the new sequence . The DTW algorithm aligns the two sequences according to the less expensive path. If the two sequences are similar, the resulting path will have a total cost low and will be quite close to the diagonal path (Fig. 12) .
3) Computation of the Final Score:
Once the new sequence has been obtained (using one of the approaches described above), the final score can be computed as follows: (9) The normalization coefficient ensures that the score is always in the range . In fact, for any DistortionCode sequence and for any of its elements , it is easy to prove that (10) and (11) Constraint (10) follows directly from the definition of DistortionCode sequence (7), constraint (11) from the definitions of integrated distortion map (5) and DistortionCode (6) .
It is worth noting that the transformations performed to obtain the new sequence do not violate the two constraints in both the proposed approaches, since:
• in the first one, , thus (10) is guaranteed by the triangular inequality and (11) by the definition of ; • in the DTW approach, , thus (10) and (11) are trivially verified.
IV. EXPERIMENTATION
A. Measuring Fake Detection Errors
A fingerprint scanner that embeds a fake-finger detection mechanism has to decide, for each transaction, if the current sample comes from a real finger or from a fake one. This decision will be unavoidably affected by errors, that should be as low as possible: in particular, a scanner could reject real fingers and/or accept fake fingers, independently of the user's identity.
In the rest of this section, we assume a system operating in verification mode. Let be the proportion of fake-finger transactions where the system incorrectly considered the input to come from a real finger. Let be the proportion of real-finger transactions where the system incorrectly considered the input to come from a fake sample. and must not be confused with identity verification errors typical of any biometric system; in the following, to avoid confusion we will denote with and the identity verification error rates. Under the simplifying hypothesis of no correlation between the two classes of errors (fake detection errors and identity verification errors), and assuming the identify verification performance is not significantly decreased by the fake-detection mechanism, the overall FRR error can be estimated as • (for an authorized user trying to be authenticated normally using the real enrolled finger). Depending on the hypotheses (Real or Fake finger, Enrolled or Nonenrolled fingerprint) under which the transaction is performed, the overall FAR error can be estimated as • -(for an attacker trying to be authenticated using a real finger, different from the enrolled one); • -(for an attacker trying to be authenticated using a fake reproduction of a finger which is not the enrolled one); • -(for an attacker trying to be authenticated using a fake reproduction of the enrolled finger), where , since, even if a fake fingerprint is created by using professional equipments, its quality is usually lower than the real finger it is designed to imitate and therefore the chance that the identity verification algorithm does not match it with the user's real template is higher. Actually, the two classes of errors (fake detection errors and identify verification errors) could be correlated in some cases: for instance, a low-quality finger may determine both a high (due, for example, to the difficulty of calculating the correct optical flow) and a high (due to the few number of minutiae that can be reliably found in its fingerprint images). It should be also considered that the adoption of a fake-detection approach may affect the performance of the identity verification system. For instance, due to the need of measuring specific features for fake-detection, it could be more difficult to acquire good quality images, thus increasing (e.g., in the case of fingerprint distortion, due to the need of producing distorted images it could be more difficult to acquire good quality images, at the beginning of the image sequence, which are not affected by distortion). Anyway, studying such correlation is beyond the scope of this work, and will be better investigated in the future.
The experiments carried out in this study consider only fakedetection errors ( and ), to avoid reporting performance indicators depending on the identity verification accuracy of a specific biometric algorithm. There is obviously a strict trade-off between and : both are functions of a fake-detection threshold .
depends also on how much skilled the attacker is, which technologies the attacker is able to implement, how much time and money (s)he can invest, etc. In the experimentation performed in this work we assumed that
• the attackers were experts of the application domain and skilled in manufacturing fake fingers (the fake fingers manufactured in our tests were made by people with 24-month experience); • attacks were carried out using some known methods (e.g., fake fingers made of silicone, gelatin and other materials commercially available); • the attackers were aware of the particular fake-detection technique adopted and did their best to defeat it (in our tests fake fingers were created trying to emulate as much as possible the human skin deformation); • attacks had to be performed in a short time and without live feedback from the device. In Sections IV-B and C, and errors measured in the experimentation are reported, together with the (the value such that ).
B. Database
In order to evaluate the proposed approach, a database of image sequences was collected using a prototype fingerprint scanner by Biometrika. No public available benchmark database could be used, due to the specific requirements of the fake detection algorithm (each sample must consist of a sequence of images acquired by a scanner while the user is rotating her/his finger and producing distortion, and samples from both real and fake fingers acquired by the same device must be available). The database was collected at the Biometric System Laboratory of the University of Bologna acquiring, from each of 45 volunteers, two fingers (thumb and forefinger of the right hand); 10 image sequences were recorded for each finger. 40 fake fingers were manufactered (10 made of RTV silicone, 10 of gelatin, 10 of latex, and 10 of wood glue). Instead of making whole 3D fake fingers, we manufactured just thin layers reproducing the fingertips (see Fig. 1 for some sample pictures): this allowed to better imitate genuine finger movements when trying to attack the system. For each fake finger, 10 image sequences were recorded. The prototype scanner produces 400 560 fingerprint images at 569 DPI and captures images at 20 fps. In Fig. 13 and in Fig. 14 some sample fingerprint images are shown.
The volunteers received a brief training before the first acquisition. Sequences having a total finger rotation angle less than 15 were discarded, and the user was asked to repeat the acquisition; no other quality check was adopted during the collection of the data (for instance ensuring that a minimum amount of distortion was produced in the sequence). The acquisition of the image sequences from the fake fingers was performed by experts, trying to emulate as much as possible the deformation of the skin in real fingers and choosing the optimal conditions for each material; for instance, image sequences from fakes made of gelatin were acquired a hour after their creation, when their elasticity is similar to the human skin, and not later, when they become rigid and easier to be discriminated from real fingers.
The parameters of the approach (see Table I ) were adjusted on a totally disjoint dataset that was collected using a different acquisition sensor (see [1] ). The only different parameter is the block size, which here was set to 16 16 pixels to increase the processing speed.
C. Results
As introduced in Section III-E, the fake detection approach here proposed may be used in two different modalities:
• per-user reference sequence: for each user, during an enrolment stage, a sequence of frames is acquired from the selected finger, the corresponding DistortionCode sequence is calculated and stored as the reference sequence for that user (similar to what happens with the fingerprint template to be used in a biometric recognition process);
• predefined reference sequence: a single reference sequence is adopted for all of the users and no enrolment stage is required for the fake detection system. Both of these operating modalities were experimented by using the same test set described in the previous section.
In the per-user reference sequence modality, the following transactions were performed on the test set:
• 4050 genuine attempts (each sequence was matched against the remaining sequences of the same finger, excluding the symmetric matches to avoid correlation, thus performing 45 attempts for each of the 90 real fingers); • 36 000 impostor attempts (each of the 400 fake sequences was matched against the first sequence of each real finger). Fig. 15 . Integrated distortion maps from the predefined reference sequence used in the experimentation; it is worth noting that the shape of the deformed region is almost elliptical and distortion is mainly confined to an elliptical annulus around the center of rotation, as discussed in [8] . Note that, since only fake-detection performance was evaluated (not combined with identity verification) and considering that the proposed approach is based on the elastic properties of real/fake fingers and not on the ridge-line pattern, it is not necessary that a fake finger corresponding to the real finger is used in the impostor attempts: any fake finger can be matched against any real finger without significantly affecting the results. In the predefined reference sequence modality, a sequence acquired from a well-trained user (not included in the test database) was selected as the predefined sequence (Fig. 15 ) and the following transactions were performed on the test set:
• 900 genuine attempts (each sequence was matched against the reference sequence, thus performing 10 attempts for each of the 90 real fingers); • 400 impostor attempts (each of the 400 fake sequences was matched against the reference sequence). Table II reports the obtained for the two alignment approaches (Sections III-E1 and III-E2) in the two modalities, respectively; Fig. 16 compares the ROC graphs.
An error analysis was performed by visually inspecting the 100 real finger sequences that obtained the lowest scores in the predefined reference sequence modality with the DTW alignment. In Table III , each sequence is labeled according to the most evident error cause: 70% of the errors were due to an incorrect movement (e.g., moving the finger in a nonuniform way, translating instead of rotating,…) or a too fast movement. Table IV analyzes the distribution of false rejection errors among the different users; since 10 sequences were acquired from two fingers of each user, the maximum number of errors for each user is 20. It is worth noting that all of the users were able to provide good sequences with both the fingers (only one user had more than 10 errors among the 100 examined: 8 with the first finger and 4 with the second).
On a Pentium IV PC at 3.2 GHz, the feature extraction takes about 100 ms for each frame: the most demanding step (80% of the feature extraction time) is the correlation, whose complexity, in the worst case, is proportional to the square of the number of foreground pixels in the image. However, thanks to an MMX optimization of the correlation routine, an efficient implementation has been achieved. The matching step proved to be very efficient: the average time is less than 1 ms for both the alignment approaches. The average transaction time is about two seconds, including acquisition, feature extraction, and matching.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Attacks to fingerprint-based biometric systems using fake reproductions of the finger may be a serious threat, in particular for nonsupervised access control applications and remote authentication applications. This work introduced a fake finger detection approach based on skin elasticity: novel techniques for extracting skin distortion information, for encoding it as DistortionCodes, and for normalizing and comparing DistortionCode sequences have been formally defined and experimentally evaluated over a test set of real and fake fingers. Two different operating modalities have been proposed: the former (per-user reference sequence) where the user is required to perform an "enrollment" before using the system, the latter (predefined reference sequence) where no enrollment is required for the fake-detection (obviously enrollment is still necessary for fingerprint recognition).
Contrary to what one may expect, the performance of the predefined modality was better than that of the per-user modality. The analysis of the main error causes for both the modalities suggested that this behavior could probably be ascribed to these facts.
• The reference DistortionCode sequence (which all the current sequences were compared to) was obtained from a well-trained user with a uniform and smooth movement, resulting in a sequence that was able to correctly represent most of real finger distortions and was very difficult to emulate using fake fingers.
• During the database collection, the volunteers received only a quick training and no specific quality control measure was enforced (except the minimum amount of finger rotation, see Section IV-B). For this reason, a good portion of the users did not produce enough distortion and their corresponding DistortionCode sequences, when used as the reference sequence in the per-user modality, were not enough dissimilar from the fake finger sequences. It is also worth noting that, in the per-user modality, the interframe rotation angle alignment approach achieved better results than the DTW-based one. This may be explained by considering that, if on the one hand DTW is more flexible in adapting to a given reference sequence (potentially decreasing ), on the other, if no minimum quality is enforced for the reference sequences, the greater flexibility is likely to affect more than . We may conclude that the predefined modality, besides being simpler to be deployed in a final system, achieves better results with nonhabituated users; on the other hand, the performance with the per-user modality may be increased if users are welltrained and habituated.
We believe the experimental results are very promising; in fact, although the system did make errors (the best achieved was 11.24%), we must underline that what we measured in our experimentation was not the robustness with respect to zero-effort attempts, but the robustness to attacks carried out by experts that were aware of the specific fake-detection technology and did their best to emulate the human skin deformation. The same experts achieved a very high success rate (comparable to those reported in [19] ) in spoofing all the commercial devices they tested [5] , including devices with specific fake-finger countermeasures. However, it should be pointed out that the proposed system, as any other fake-detection mechanisms, trades usability for security: for some large scale low-security applications it may not be worth adopting a fake-finger detection system, while, for other high-security applications, the fake-detection operating threshold may be adjusted to meet the given constraints.
Although in the experiments performed we were not able to find a way to make the proposed system ineffective, as for any other similar system it cannot be totally excluded that someone might find a combination of techniques and materials that significantly decrease its efficacy. Combining this fake-detection system with other methods based on uncorrelated features (e.g., impedance, odor [2] ) could make the resulting system even more reliable.
The proposed fake detection approach is not privacy invasive, since it does not collect any information (such as, for instance, blood pulsation or blood pressure) that may reveal medical diseases; it has the further advantage of not requiring expensive additional hardware, provided that the fingerprint scanner is able to acquire images at a proper frame rate.
Future work will be mainly dedicated to • implementation and evaluation of alternative alignment techniques for the DistortionCode sequences; • experimentation on a larger user population;
• implementation of quality control measures for the enrollment stage in the per-user modality; • better understanding the relation between fake detection errors and identity verification errors. While this paper is being written, a usability study is being conducted by Prof. Bente's team at the University of Cologne where the Biometrika fingerprint scanner equipped with our fake detection approach is being experimented outside of laboratory environments. The feedback from that experimentation will help to improve the approach here introduced, thank to the complementary information that a user-centered perspective may provide.
